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I. INTRODUCTION
Foster care. There are probably no two words in the English language that convey
more of a sense of good intentions gone bad. Children enter foster care when their
own parents fail them. Then they begin a state-sponsored journey through an over-
land railroad of foster homes, some run by adults who truly want to help, and
others run by scoundrels.'
The purpose of foster care is to provide a temporary safe haven for
children whose parents are unable to care for them. Unfortunately,
however, the foster care system frequently fails to provide children with
stable, secure care,2 and fails to meet their medical, psychological, and
1. Judy Mann, Fostering Common Sense, Wash. Post D3 (Apr. 18, 1990).
2. See Bright Futures or Broken Dreams: The Status of the Children of the District of Co-
lumbia and an Investment Agenda for the 1990s, Report of the Children's Defense Fund, at 90-
116 (highlighting deficiencies in Washington, D.C.'s foster care program and the resulting crisis for
foster children). See generally Tracy Thompson, Trial Reveals Foster Care's Dead End in D.C.,
Washington Post D1 (Feb. 11, 1991) (describing the host of problems that make arranging perma-
nent homes for children extremely difficult); John Hurst, County Accused of Letting Foster Chil-
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emotional needs. Many children spend the better part of their child-
hoods in foster homes,3 often suffering mental, emotional, and physical
abuse at the hands of their state-appointed foster parents. Stories of
neglected, battered children and horrible living conditions pervade the
case law.4
Deteriorating family relationships and systemic flaws within the
child welfare system are to blame for foster family abuse and program
abuse.5 Among the interrelated problems merging into the foster crisis
are an increased number of foster children, weakened family relation-
ships, deteriorating social conditions, overextended and inefficiently
managed child welfare agencies, and poor training of case workers and
prospective foster parents. These factors have resulted in an ineffective
bureaucracy that has lost sight of its purpose-safe temporary care for
children in search of a permanent home.
dren Suffer Abuse, L.A. Times A3 (Mar. 8, 1990) (stating that the local children's services agency
has failed to protect foster shildren from substandard conditions and care); Michael D'Antonio,
Foster Care Failings: Abandoned, Abused Kids Stuck in a System Lacking Money-And Fami-
lies, Newsday 5 (Dec. 4, 1988) (discussing the failure of the foster care system to meet its responsi-
bilities); J. C. Barden, Foster Care System Reeling, Despite Law Meant to Help, N.Y. Times Al
(Sept. 21, 1990) (stating that foster care has become a "multi-billion dollar system of confusion
and misdirection"); Thomas J. Downey and George Miller, Ten Years Later: Foster Care, Again,
Christian Science Monitor 18 (Jul. 10, 1990) (discussing the deterioration of foster care due to
increasing social problems).
3. The system frequently fails to rehabilitate families or minimize the time children spend in
state custody. Thus, some children drift for years in the foster care system, a condition Justice
Brennan has termed "limbo." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 836 (1977).
4. The cases are replete with appalling stories of neglect, malnourishment, and abuse of chil-
dren at the hands of their foster parents. See, for example, K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir.
1990) (involving a young girl who was placed in nine foster homes over the course of three and half
years, and subjected to beatings and sexual assault in a number of the placements); Taylor v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989) (involving a two-year-
old girl who fell into a coma after her foster mother slapped, shook, and threw her to the floor);
Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Serv., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 148 (1989) (involving a four-year-old boy, who was moved to a safe foster home, only after
he had sustained multiple bruises, a fractured leg, a deep laceration over his left eye, and burns
that permanently disfigured his hand). In another Missouri case, a foster mother whipped a four-
year-old and forced her to stand with her hands over her head for a half-hour as punishment for
being dirty. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. 199, 200 (1988). See also G.L. v. Zum-
walt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (involving an epileptic baby who was placed in a foster
home that the state knew was inadequate to meet her medical needs). By reporting these atrocious
stories, the media focused public attention on the instances of abuse, thereby reducing the family
privacy considerations that had shielded such situations from public and judicial scrutiny in the
past. Stacy Colvin, Note, LaShawn A. v. Dixon: Responding to The Pleas of Children, 49 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 529, 533 nn.20, 22 (1992).
5. Downey and Miller, Christian Science Monitor at 18 (Jul. 10, 1990) (cited in note 2). Pro-
fessor Mushlin uses the terms foster family abuse and program abuse to describe the aforemen-
tioned types of abuse and neglect in foster care. See Mushlin, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. at 204-09
(cited in note 4).
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Currently, the nation's foster care system contains approximately
400,000 children, a record high.' This high number may be the result of
several trends, including a growing number of placements related to
drug and alcohol abuse or exposure,7 homelessness,8 and family disar-
ray. As a result, increasing numbers of younger children are entering
out-of-home placements, a disproportionately large number of minority
children are in foster care9 (with longer stays there), and more children
require repeat placements.10 Unfortunately, the increase in children
needing foster care has been accompanied by an insufficient supply of
adequate foster family homes to meet the demand.11
Not surprisingly, child welfare caseloads have accelerated beyond
the ability of foster care systems to provide minimal care and services.' 2
Despite the fact that most states and municipalities are aware of the
inadequacies of their programs, budgetary constraints"3 as well as inef-
fectual administrative and bureaucratic procedures 4 hamper efficient
implementation of foster care programs. Foster care systems are admin-
6. House Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, H.R. Rep. No. 101-395, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 17-19 (1990). After some contraction in the early 1980s, the number of children in foster care
stood at about 275,000 in 1985, rose to 340,000 by 1988, and today aggregates nearly 400,000. Id.
7. Drug and alcohol abuse, and most recently, the crack epidemic, have been significant
factors causing child abuse and neglect cases. Between 10% and 20% of newborn infants in low-
income urban areas are exposed to drugs before they are born. Because of parental substance
abuse, infants and children are being referred to the child welfare system and the foster care sys-
tem in unprecedented numbers. Child Welfare Services Are Being Strained By Drug Crisis, Mich-
igan Lawyers Weekly at 22 (Feb. 17, 1992).
8. Statistics show that approximately 100,000 American children are homeless. Id.
9. See Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980's: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the
Warren Years, Fam. L.Q. 255 (1986) (explaining that State foster care systems inflict additional
harm on already damaged children).
[Foster care] systems take these children of the poor and, in many instances, complete
what poverty and discrimination have begun, destroying salvageable human beings and pro-
ducing yet another generation of the economically dependent and socially and psychologically
unfit. Grown up, these former foster children fill our mental hospitals, our jails, and our wel-
fare rolls. One study found that 50 percent of the homeless youth on our streets are young
people who were raised in foster care.
Id. at 257.
10. Daniel L. Skoler, A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster Care?-Time for the Supreme
Court to Pay Its I.O.U., 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. 353, 357 (1991).
11. Id. See, for example, Jerry Cheslow, Foster Care in State Is Facing A. Crisis, N.Y. Times
§ 12NJ at 1 (Aug. 13, 1989) (stating that the foster care system in New Jersey is facing a shortage
of foster parents).
12. Child Welfare, Mich. L. Weekly at 22.
13. For example, in a District of Columbia child welfare agency, 80 of the 240 social worker
positions are vacant, a result of budget problems. Tracy Thompson, Trial Reveals Foster Care's
Dead End in D.C., Washington Post D1 (Feb. 11, 1991).
14. See J.C. Barden, Group Says Violations Pervade Capital Foster Care, N.Y. Times A22
(Oct. 28, 1990).
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istered by staffs that are overburdened, 15 poorly paid, and often un-
trained for the difficult work they are called upon to perform.16 The
lack of financial resources has led to a poorly organized system that
often lacks basic information about its own operation. 17 Foster parents
also receive inadequate financial support. Payments offered to foster
parents often are insufficient to cover the cost of caring for the child's
basic needs. This lack of funding adds financial stress to the burdens of
being a foster parent.'
Many of the overburdened state welfare agencies have failed to
meet professional standards, a failure ultimately connected to incidents
of foster family abuse and neglect.' 9 Professional standards require
careful screening and licensing of potential foster care parents, training
of those who are hired, careful matching of foster children with foster
parents, and regular, continual supervision of the placement by
caseworkers.20 Supervision by trained caseworkers enables the agency to
ascertain whether the child is receiving proper care. An agency's sup-
plying training and providing support also relieves the anxieties of fos-
ter parents and increases their understanding of the child.2 Failure to
15. Foster care caseworkers in the District of Columbia characterize their agency not as an
inhumane bureaucracy, but as the "governmental equivalent of a frantic parent who cannot rescue
his children from a burning house." According to the workers, caseloads are three times the recom-
mended number. The workers also describe 80-hour weeks and supervisors who cannot do their job
because they inherit the work left behind when burned-out employees quit. In a deposition, one
worker said:
I feel strongly that if I had a smaller caseload, I could be more effective.... As it stands right
now ... workers seem to function in a crisis-oriented situation. A fire starts and you put it out
and then we move on to the next.
Thompson, Wash. Post at D1 (Feb. 11, 1991) (cited in note 13).
16. Mushlin, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. at 213 (cited in note 4).
17. Id.
18. Thus, the foster care system needs funds to hire additional trained social workers who
can carefully screen and regularly supervise foster homes. Additional social workers are also neces-
sary to train foster parents and to ensure that an adequate number of foster parents are available
so that foster homes are not overloaded with more children than they can handle. See id. at 209-
11. Funds also must be allocated to hire medical personnel to implement and supervise a basic
medical care system. See id. at 208-09.
Present governmental funding of foster care exceeds one billion dollars annually. The federal
government provides 53% of that amount with the remaining 47% coming from state and local
sources. The federal funds primarily are provided through matching funds made available under
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. House Comm. on Children at 67, 120-21.
19. Mushlin, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. at 209-10. See Barden, N.Y. Times at A22 (Oct. 28,
1990) (cited in note 14).
20. Mushlin, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. at 210.
21. Id. Social workers should provide training, support, and consultation to foster parents to
help them understand and guide foster children. Absent these forms of state support, foster par-
ents can find the behavior of foster children baffling or inexplicable, or may feel that they are
engulfed in an endless struggle for control. Professional standards also provide for the elimination
of foster home overcrowding, strict bans on improper punishment, and prompt referrals for outside
investigation of all suspicions of maltreatment by foster parents. Id. at 210-11.
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do so may result in increased foster family abuse and neglect by foster
parents.22
Congress designed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 198023 (the "Act") to reduce problematic foster care placements by
requiring state welfare agencies to provide services to families at risk.
This federal policy emphasizes avoidance of unnecessary out-of-home
placements; family reunification for children in foster custody whenever
possible; periodic review of the foster child's progress; permanency
planning, including adoption, for children separated from natural par-
ents for extended periods of time; greater delegation of authority to fos-
ter parents; and increased state court supervision of foster care
placements.24
Although the Act is a substantial move toward foster care reform,
it is inadequate because it lacks an enforcement mechanism.2" Enforce-
ment actions must be made available to foster children in order to
achieve the urgently needed reform intended by Congress. Foster chil-
dren are perhaps the most powerless political group in this country. Be-
cause children do not vote, cannot organize politically, and are
incapable of donating financial support to political figures, their needs
often are overlooked. 26 As a result, when economic constraints require
trade-offs in a state's budget, children's programs often are the first to
be sacrificed. Foster children largely are unrepresented even in the
court proceedings that lead to their placement.28 Living without paren-
tal protection, they are completely subject to the whims of the very per-
22. Id. at 211. One study connected abuse of foster children with insufficient training of fos-
ter parents, foster home overcrowding, the failure to match foster children with appropriate par-
ents, and the failure to make regular visits to foster homes. Another study linked the continuing
foster child abuse to the failure of agencies to refer allegations of abuse and neglect to the proper
authorities for investigation and their failure to follow-up on suspicions of abuse. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79 (1988).
24. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 357-58 (cited in note 10).
25. See note 91 and accompanying text.
26. Colvin, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 530 (cited in note 4). See also Hillary Rodham, Chil-
dren Under the Law, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 487, 492-93 (1983) (discussing inability of children to
secure rights for themselves).
Furthermore, foster care is a service almost always reserved for the children of the poor and
underclass. Also, "in most states, foster care is disproportionately used by minority children who,
not unexpectedly, have encountered discrimination in the foster care system." Mushlin, 23 Harv.
CR-CL L. Rev. at 213 (cited in note 4).
27. Colvin, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 531. Colvin writes that some cities consciously disre-
gard court orders to improve foster care programs. Id. See also Michael Powell, It's a Scofflaw
Budget, Newsday 7 (June 20, 1991) (explaining that states ignore court orders to fund programs
such as foster care).
28. Robert M. Horowitz and Howard A. Davidson, eds., Legal Rights of Children 296-99
(Shepard'sfMcGraw-Hill, 1984). Foster children usually have no voice in regard to placements. In




sons who may be maltreating them."9 Abused foster children must
depend on child activists to voice their concerns and call public atten-
tion to their plight.5 0
While the Act does provide requirements to ensure good foster
care, it focuses on issues other than maltreatment. Generally, support-
ers of foster care reform champion the reunification concerns of natural
parents or the adoption concerns of foster parents. As a result, these
advocates have focused their efforts on reducing reliance on foster care
rather than on maintaining safety within the foster care system.3 1 Natu-
ral parents and their advocates have mobilized to increase the availabil-
ity of preventive services while adoptive parents have lobbied for the
implementation of strong permanency planning programs.32
This Note argues that if reform of the foster care system is to suc-
ceed, two actions for injunctive relief-Section 1983 claims to enforce
the "reasonable efforts" requirement of the Act and substantive due
process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment-should be made
available to foster children. Part II of the Note describes the provisions
of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 in general
terms. Part III argues that in spite of a recent Supreme Court decision
to the contrary, the critical "reasonable efforts" requirement of the Act
creates enforceable rights for Section 1983 civil rights claims. The Act
aspires to avoid foster care placements by providing services that will
keep biological families together or find adoptive homes for dislocated
children. Although the Act also demands adequate foster care condi-
tions, it maintains a focus beyond safety concerns. Therefore, Part IV
advocates the use of substantive due process claims as a companion to
Section 1983 actions to enforce the Act itself, so that the constitutional
right to safety of children in state custody is protected.
II. THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1980
In an attempt to remedy the problems in the foster care system,
Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, a measure vitally important to the future of the child welfare sys-
29. Mushlin, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. at 214 (cited in note 4).
30. Colvin, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 533 (cited in note 4).
The status of children as political beings under the law is beginning to emerge from its em-
bryonic form. The courts tend to see the family as a private unit and generally find it inap-
propriate to subject a family to political analysis or moral scrutiny. Though the autonomy
granted to an individual family unit manifests itself in a variety of circumstances, the ever-
increasing atrocities within traditional family settings have opened the family unit to the pub-
lic eye.
31. Mushlin, 23 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. at 214.
32. Id. at 214-15.
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tem. Congress intended for the Act to protect children in foster care
and to alleviate foster care drift by creating a comprehensive regulatory
structure for state programs.3 The goal of the Act was to respond to
the needs of children lost in the foster care system by ensuring that
reasonable efforts are made to maintain children in their natural homes,
to return them to those homes after removal, or to find permanent
adoptive homes. Prior to the Act's passage, the Social Security Act
3 4
governed foster care. The effectiveness of the Social Security Act was
limited, however, because it provided neither financial incentives for
states to take children out of foster care and place them for adoption
5
nor funding for preventive services to keep families together. 6 These
inadequacies further contributed to the already complex problems fac-
ing the malfunctioning foster care system.
3 7
In an effort to improve foster care conditions, Congress passed the
Act with three goals in mind: first, to provide families with sufficient
preplacement services to prevent the need for children to enter the fos-
ter care system; second, to protect and provide proper care to children
while they remain in foster care; and third, to move children through
the foster care system and back home or into adoptive placements as
quickly as possible.3 ' The Act provides federal financial assistance to
33. 42 U.S.C. § 670.
34. Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988), provided
federal financial assistance for children who would qualify for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) but for their removal from their homes.
35. The Social Security Act gave financial assistance to states for foster care only, to the total
exclusion of adoption, thereby creating a financial disincentive to place children in permanent
homes. As a result, children often lingered in foster care for unduly long periods of time. For a
more detailed description of the shortcomings of adoption and foster care law before the Act's
passage, see Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 593, 598-99 (1992).
36. The federal funding scheme also was limited because it provided AFDC foster care reim-
bursement only for out of home care. Id.
37. See Barden, N.Y. Times at Al (cited in note 2). The sheer increase in the number of
foster children, due largely to poverty and increased parental drug and alcohol abuse, has strained
states' finances and resources. In 1989, 3000 New York City infants entered foster care from hospi-
tals as a result of drug use by their mothers. In Los Angeles, approximately 90% of the 20,000
children who come before juvenile courts come from homes where parental drug or alcohol abuse is
present. Aside from these cases related to substance abuse problems, many children still enter
foster care due to the lack of affordable housing for low income families. Id. at A18.
38. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 596 (cited in note 35). See also 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1) (Supp.
1992), which provides:
[T]he term "child welfare services" means public social services which are directed toward the
accomplishment of the following purposes: (A) protecting and promoting the welfare of all
children, including handicapped, homeless, dependent, or neglected children; (B) preventing
or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse,
exploitation, or delinquency of children; (C) preventing the unnecessary separation of chil-
dren from their families by identifying family problems, assisting families in resolving their
problems, and preventing breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is
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states that structure and implement a foster care system in accordance
with the statute's requirements.89 Conversely, the Act authorizes the
withdrawal or reduction of financial assistance from states that do not
comply with the federal requirements. °
The Act consists of two parts, Title IV-E, which provides for par-
tial reimbursement by the federal government of "foster care mainte-
nance payments" made by the states, and Title IV-B, which applies to
the provision of child welfare services in general. Together, the two ti-
tles require that states adopt and implement three separate plans in
order to receive federal financial assistance: (1) a Child Welfare Plan to
direct the provision of child welfare services;4' (2) a Foster Care Plan to
guide the overall operation of their foster care systems;4 2 and (3) an
individualized Case Plan specific to each child in foster care.4" The
states also must create a Case Review System to review periodically the
status of every foster child.44 In addition, each state is eligible for addi-
tional funds if certain informational structures are established. Each of
these plans has requirements that overlap with the Act's goals. 45 This
comprehensive program is supposed to address the needs of foster chil-
desirable and possible; (D) restoring to their families children who have been removed, by the
provision of services to the child and the families; (E) placing children in suitable adoptive
homes, in cases where the restoration to the biological family is not possible or appropriate;
and (F) assuring adequate care of children away from their homes, in cases where the child
cannot be returned home or cannot be placed for adoption.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 674 (Supp. 1992). See also Mary Lee Allen, A Guide to the Adop-
tion Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in Foster Children and the Courts, Mark Hardin,
ed. 710-17 (Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1983) (providing detailed analysis of the Act's funding
provisions).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (1988).
41. Id. § 622(a). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.21, 1356.20(a) (1990) (setting requirements for
contents, submission, and inspection of state plans). The requirements for the Child Welfare Plan
are largely administrative. The plan must provide for a single organizational unit to furnish child
welfare services under Section 622(b)(1)(B), and it must coordinate the provision of child welfare
services with other social services under Section 622(b)(2). The plan also must provide for the
training and effective use of a paid paraprofessional staff under Section 622(b)(4), and it must
emphasize the full- or part-time employment of persons "of low income, as community service
aides, in the administration of the plan, and... the use of nonpald or partially paid volunteers in
providing services and in assisting any advisory committees established by the State agency." Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1988); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1356.20(a), 1356.21(a) (1990). The Act requires
that the Foster Care Plan include a variety of administrative provisions (see Section 671(a)), such
as a procedure for maintaining confidentiality for the individuals assisted by the program (see
Section 671(a)(8)), and a procedure for making foster care maintenance payments (see Section
671(a)(1)). In addition, the Foster Care Plan must provide an opportunity for a fair hearing to any
individual who has been denied benefits or whose claims have not been acted upon in a timely
manner. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1988).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1988).
44. Id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5)(B).
45. The following description of the Act's provisions follows Atwell's analysis. See Atwell, 60
U. Cin. L. Rev. at 602-11 (cited in note 35).
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dren and their biological, foster, and adoptive families from the mo-
ment the children at risk are reported to the agency until they are
placed permanently with their parents or an adoptive family.4
In order to prevent the need for foster care, the Act provides that
states are entitled to reimbursement for foster care maintenance pay-
ments only if they make "reasonable efforts... prior to placement of a
child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the
child from his home. '47 Although the Act does not define reasonable
efforts, the regulations48 suggest that reasonable efforts may include
certain services aimed at preventing the unnecessary separation of chil-
dren from their families by identifying and helping families resolve
their problems.4 9 The regulations set forth some specific examples of
child welfare services that may satisfy the reasonable efforts require-
ment including arranging emergency financial assistance; temporary
child care; home-based family services; self-help groups; services to un-
married parents; mental health, drug and alcohol abuse counseling; and
vocational counseling or training.50
To ensure that children placed in foster care are safe,51 the Foster
Care Plan requires that states establish and maintain foster care stan-
dards that meet the recommended standards of national foster care or-
ganizations.52 In addition, every foster family home or other child-care
institution must meet state licensing requirements. 3 If the state has
evidence to indicate that the child is being neglected, abused, or ex-
ploited, it must take affirmative steps to alert the appropriate agency or
46. Id. at 601.
47. Id. § 671(a)(15). As Senator Alan Cranston explained:
States must make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of children from their homes. In
the past, foster care has often been the first option selected when a family is in trouble; the
new provisions will require States to examine alternatives and provide, wherever feasible,
home-based services that will help keep families together, or help reunite families.... Far too
many children and families have been broken apart when they could have been preserved
with little effort. Foster care ought to be a last resort rather than the first.
126 Cong. Rec. 14,767 (1980).
48. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (1990).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(C) (1988). These measures should be taken in cases where keeping
the family together is desirable and possible. Some situations, however, may require that the child
be separated from his family. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 602 (cited in note 35). State protective
agencies will continue to have the authority to remove children from dangerous situations immedi-
ately. 126 Cong. Rec. 14,767 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston). See also Celia W. Dugger, New
York City Bets Millions on Preserving Families, N.Y. Times Al (July 19, 1991). The effectiveness
of preventive services is debatable. Id.
50. 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e)(2) (1991).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) (1988).
52. Id. The standards must be reviewed periodically. Id. § 671(a)(11); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)
(1991).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (1988).
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law enforcement officials.5 4 Further, as part of the Case Review Sys-
tem,55 the state must establish a procedure for determining the appro-
priateness of the placement. Program workers must review and update
the educational and health records of each child 5 and make the infor-
mation available to the foster parents or other care providers to help
them improve care for the children.
The Case Plan is the primary instrument employed to ensure that
each child receives proper care while in state custody.58 Although the
Act does not expressly define all that is encompassed by the term
"proper care," it does require that the Case Plan include a description
of the home or institution in which a child must be placed as well as a
discussion of the appropriateness of the child's placement there.5" The
Act suggests that proper care begins with placing the child in the most
family-like setting available. A family-like setting is in close proximity
to the parents' home, when such an arrangement is "consistent with the
best interests and special needs of the child."6' 0 Proper care also re-
quires ensuring the child's physical well-being,6' by providing adequate
food, clothing and shelter; 2 reviewing the child's health and education
records;63 considering the placement's proximity to the child's school;
4
protecting the child's emotional well-being; and protecting the child's
civil rights.6 5 The prompt assignment of a caseworker to each child and
regular visits by the caseworker to the foster home are also essential.
Current information is vital to foster care programs. To this end,
Title IV-B provides financial incentives for states to establish informa-
tion networks to update foster care records. A state may be entitled to
additional payments specifically for foster care services if it implements
a statewide information system to monitor each foster child who has
been in the system within the past twelve months.6 6 Without an infor-
mation system, agencies may lose track of children in their care.
7
54. Id. § 671(a)(9).
55. Id. § 675(5)(B).
56. Id. § 675(5)(D).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 675(1)(B).
59. Id. § 675(1)(A).
60. Id. § 675(5)(A).
61. Id. § 671(a)(10).
62. Id. § 675(4)(A).
63. Id. § 675(5)(D). The Case Plan must include health and education information, such as
the child's grade-level in school, his or her school record, and a record of any known medical
problems. Id. § 675(1)(C).
64. Id. § 675(1)(C).
65. Id. § 671(a)(10).
66. Id. § 627(a).
67. The current information system
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Therefore, a network provides essential access to critical information,
including the child's foster home, school, special health care needs, and
placement goals. 8 In order to qualify for the Additional Payments Pro-
gram, states also must conduct an inventory of all foster children who
have been in the system for the past six months to determine the ap-
propriateness of their placement, e to review their placement goals,70
and to coordinate the necessary services to achieve those goals.7 1 An
inventory system should help determine whether the child can or
should be returned to her parents or freed for adoption. Further, the
inventory system should help identify the services necessary to facili-
tate either choice.
7 2
Each of the programs mandated by the Act must include a plan-
ning component for determining the child's permanent home and must
provide whatever services are necessary to find that home.73 The Foster
Care Plan specifically requires that agencies make reasonable efforts to
return children to their homes by providing the services required by the
Act.74 Though the Act leaves reasonable efforts undefined, the legisla-
tive history suggests that reasonable efforts to reunify families include
transportation services, family and individual therapy, psychiatric
counseling, homemaking and housekeeping services, day care, consumer
education, respite care, information and referral services, and various
is unable to accurately identify the physical location of all of the children in foster care....
[S]ocial workers track information on thousands of three-by-five index cards.... The Court
can only wonder how an agency that cannot track the location of the children in its custody
can possibly comply with the remaining requirements of federal ... law, much less within
reasonable professional standards.
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 976-77 (D.D.C. 1991).
68. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 607 (cited in note 35).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(1) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 1357.25(b) (1991).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(1) (1988).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 627(a)(2)(C). The Act provides for comprehensive services that are critical to the
program's success in finding permanent homes for displaced foster children. The Child Welfare
Plan includes services for restoring children to their families and placing children in suitable adop-
tive homes, in cases in which restoration to the biological family is either impossible or inappropri-
ate. Id. § 625(a)(1)(D)-(E). Similarly, the Case Plan is defined, in part, as a plan to facilitate the
return of a child to his or her own home or to the permanent placement location of the child. Id. §
675(1)(B). The Plan must provide the services to the child, foster parents, and biological parents
necessary to achieve this goal. The Case Plan also must include a description of the services of-
fered and provided to prevent removal of the child from the home and to reunify the family. 45
C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(4) (1991). Finally, the Additional Payments Program requires that the state
implement a "service program" designed to place the child back in a permanent family setting. 42
U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(C) (1988). The regulations expressly require that the state set forth specifically
in the Child Welfare Plan which preplacement preventive and unification services are available to
children and families in need. 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e)(1) (1991).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
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transition and follow-up services. 5 Other services, such as adequate vis-
itation between the foster child and his or her natural parents while the
child is in foster care also may constitute reasonable efforts.7 6
In order to monitor progress toward a permanent placement, the
Case Review System provides for a two-tiered review that continues as
long as the child remains in foster care.7 7 First, a periodic review is con-
ducted by either a court or an administrative agency every six months
78
to evaluate the need for and appropriateness of the child's current
placement and to assess the progress made toward a permanent place-
ment.7 9 The second review consists of a formal dispositional court hear-
ing, held within eighteen months of the original placement, to
determine the future status of the child.80
While the Act is a major step in the right direction in terms of
foster care reform, the lack of remedies to enforce its provisions coupled
with the severe problems plaguing the system makes judicial enforce-
ment measures necessary. Aside from the potential elimination or re-
duction of federal financial assistance, the Act includes few penalties
for a state's failure to comply with its terms.8 1 Reducing or eliminating
federal funds, however, will only harm the recipients of these state-pro-
vided services, namely, foster children and their families. The statute
itself is silent as to whether children living in foster care can enforce
the Act privately. Nonetheless, allowing private enforcement82 of the
75. H.R. Rep. No. 136, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1979).
76. Foster care maintenance payments include travel payments incurred for visitation.
Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 609 n.44 (cited in note 35). According to Atwell, Congress also in-
tended that the Case Review System include procedural safeguards, concerning visitation rights.
See S. Rep. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1453. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (1988).
78. Id. § 675(5)(B).
79. Id. § 675(5)(A)-(B).
80. Id. § 675(5)(C). See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(e).
81. Aside from reducing or eliminating funding, the only remedy the Act provides lies in
Section 671(a)(12), which requires an opportunity for a fair hearing to any individual who has been
denied benefits or whose claims have not been acted upon in a timely manner. For a detailed
analysis of due process concerns regarding the fair hearing provision, see Harold M. Freiman,
'Some Get a Little and Some Get None': When Is Process Due Through Child Welfare and Foster
Care Fair Hearings Under P.L. 96-272?, 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 343 (1989) (arguing that
Congress intended that the fair hearing requirement would ensure that qualified recipients of a
broad range of services, including preventive and reunification services, would not be denied such
services without due process of law).
82. Private enforcement actions should seek injunctive relief as opposed to damages. Individ-
ual actions for damages are not useful mechanisms for achieving reform because they focus on
individual culpability for past actions instead of on detecting and corrrecting institutional deficien-
cies that contribute to the problem. A claim for damages, by its nature, examines past wrongs and
seeks to compensate for them, while a claim for equitable relief, such as injunction, seeks to pre-




Act through Section 1983 actions and substantive due process claims
will make the Act a more effective tool for foster care reform.
III. PRIVATE ENFORCMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF FOSTER CHILDREN
A. Section 1983 Actions
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for the deprivation
of a right or privilege provided by the laws of the United States.8 3 A
Section 1983 action is available to redress violations of federal statutes
by state agents,8 4 except when Congress has foreclosed such enforce-
ment of the statute in the language of the statute itself or when the
statute does not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities
within the meaning of Section 1983.85 In the absence of an express ex-
clusion, Section 1983 claims may be foreclosed when the statute's reme-
dial scheme demonstrates congressional intent to preclude the use of
Section 1983 as a remedy. 6 When Congress has not foreclosed a Section
1983 claim within a statute, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving
that the statute creates enforceable rights under Section 1983.7 The
threshold inquiry is whether Congress intended the provision in ques-
tion to benefit the plaintiff.8 8 If the threshold inquiry is met, a right is
created unless the provision reflects merely a "congressional preference
for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the
83. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action in law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Thus, a person who has been deprived of a federal statutory right can,
under appropriate circumstances, sue state officials responsible for the deprivation of that right.
See also Henry Paul Managhan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 233 (1991) (discussing states' duty to enforce federal statutory rights).
84. See, for example, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
85. See, for example, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
86. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 451 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)). See also Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103, 107 (1989) (reasoning that the statutory framework must be such that allowing a plaintiff
to bring a Section 1983 action "would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme")
(quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)).
87. Vantage Healthcare Corp. v. Virginia Bd. of Med. Assistance Serv., 684 F. Supp. 1329,
1331 (E.D. Va. 1988).
88. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 (citing Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 106).
19931
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[state]" 89 or unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is too vague and
amorphous for the judiciary to enforce.90
Most of the litigation surrounding the Act has involved two provi-
sions-the provision requiring the state to exert reasonable efforts to
prevent removal of children from their homes or to facilitate their re-
turn to home,9 ' and the provision requiring the state to develop a Case
Plan and Case Review System. 2 Generally, the courts have agreed that
the Case Plan/Case Review provision is specific enough to create an en-
forceable right. In a recent decision, however, the Supreme Court en-
dangered future actions to enforce the Act's provisions by holding, in
spite of circuit court decisions to the contrary, that the reasonable ef-
forts provision does not create enforceable rights under Section 1983.93
The reasonable efforts provision should create enforceable rights be-
cause it satisfies the established legal tests and because, in terms of pol-
icy, the provision helps guarantee the effectiveness of the Act itself.
1. Suter v. Artist M.: A Setback for Private Enforcement
The Supreme Court's decision in Suter v. Artist M., 94 the latest
case on the enforceability of foster care legislation, constitutes a severe
setback for private enforcement of the Act. In Suter, the Court held
that foster children and other dependent children may not maintain
private actions under Section 1983 to enforce their rights under the rea-
89. Id. at 509 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)).
90. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 (citing Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Wright,
479 U.S. at 431-32)).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
92. Id. § 671(a)(16). Because the Act mandates that the state create the Case Plan and Case
Review System to qualify for federal financial assistance, and because the requirements of each are
specifically stated, the courts uniformly have found that this provision creates enforceable rights
under Section 1983. The Act requires that the Case Plan include specific information and ensure
that every foster child receive "proper care," which includes providing for both the physical and
emotional well-being of the child. Id. § 675(5)(A). The Case Review System requires periodic re-
view of each foster child's status and sets forth both procedural and substantive guidelines for the
performance of those reviews. Id. § 675(5)(B). See Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983)
(upholding private action rights and the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief to enforce the
state's case plan and case review obligations under the Act, including a worker caseload limit);
Darr ex rel. L. J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that Sections 671(a)(9),
(10) and (16), taken together, spell out "a standard of conduct," and as a corollary, rights in plain-
tiffs, in holding that plaintiff foster children were entitled to injunctive relief and money damages
to redress physical, sexual, and medical neglect that had resulted from improper administration of
the city's federally funded program activities), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989).
Attempts to enforce various other provisions of the Act, such as meaningful visitation and
placement in the least restrictive setting, have been largely unsuccessful.
93. See notes 94-105 and accompanying text (discussing Suter v. Artist M.).
94. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
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sonable efforts requirement 5 of the Act. The Court reasoned that the
funding clause does not create enforceable rights but rather imposes
only a generalized duty on the states to be enforced by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.
e
9
The Suter majority nominally recognized the established test: Sec-
tion 1983 is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute
when Congress has foreclosed such enforcement in the enactment itself
and when the statute does not create enforceable rights, privileges or
immunities within the meaning of Section 1983.2 The Court reasoned,
however, that the ultimate question was whether Congress unambigu-
ously conferred upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce
the requirement that the state make reasonable efforts to prevent the
removal of children from their homes and to reunify families when
state-imposed separation has occurred.98 In other words, the Court de-
parted from the standard test to hold that Congress must confer such
rights unambiguously when it intends to impose conditions on the grant
of federal monies.99
The Court distinguished Suter from Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Association.100 In Wilder, the Court had found that a measure in the
Medicaid Act similar to the one in the Act allowed a plaintiff to bring a
Section 1983 claim. The Wilder Court had decided that the Medicaid
Act set out standards for determining whether states have adopted rea-
sonable and adequate reimbursement rates. However, the Suter Court
found that the Act neither sets out these standards1°' nor provides suf-
ficient guidance as to how reasonable efforts are to be measured. There-
fore, according to the Suter Court, the Act is a directive whose meaning
will vary with the circumstances of each individual case."0 2 The Suter
Court also found it significant that the Act's enforcement regulations
are not specific and do not condition the receipt of federal funds on
anything other than submitting a plan with the requisite features.
03
95. Under Section 671(a)(15) of Title IV-E of the Act, states that seek financial assistance
for foster care and adoptive services must have a plan that "provides that, in each case, reasonable
efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the
need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to
his home."
96. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1368.
97. Id. at 1366 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)).
98. Id. at 1367.
99. Id.
100. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).





In dissent, Justice Blackmun applied the traditional three-pronged
test'04 and accused the majority of disregarding established precedent
for determining the availability of a cause of action under Section 1983.
Justice Blackmun found the majority's conclusion inconsistent with
Wilder.05 Justice Blackmun's dissent illustrates why the reasonable ef-
forts requirement satisfies the established standard and thereby creates
an enforceable right under Section 1983.
2. Why the Act Creates an Enforceable Right to "Reasonable
Efforts"
To determine whether the provisions of the Act are enforceable in
a Section 1983 civil rights action, the first question is whether Congress
foreclosed a Section 1983 claim. In the Act, Congress did not explicitly
foreclose Section 1983 claims. In the absence of an express exclusion,
Section 1983 claims still may be foreclosed when the remedial scheme
within a statute comprehensively shows that Congress intended to pre-
clude the use of Section 1983 as a remedy.10 6 However, the remedial
scheme within the Act is far from comprehensive. The Act focuses on
the "establishment of a framework for the smooth operation of state
foster care systems rather than on remedies for state failures to com-
ply" with the Act's requirements.' 0 7 The Act provides as remedies the
right to a hearing for individuals whose applications for benefits have
been denied and the right to 108 a dispositional hearing conducted within
eighteen months of the child's first placement in foster care to develop
plans for the child's future. 0 9 Beyond these rights the only remaining
remedy is the reduction or termination of federal financial assistance to
noncomplying state programs.
In prior cases, the Supreme Court held that the ability to reduce or
terminate funds is insufficient to constitute congressional foreclosure of
Section 1983 actions. 10 The Court also has found that the right to a
hearing as created by the Act is insufficient to foreclose Section 1983
104. Id. at 1371 (Blackmun, dissenting).
105. Id. at 1375 (Blackmun, dissenting).
106. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521 (quoting National Sea Clammers, 451 U.S. at 20).
107. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 613 (cited in note 35).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1988). The right to a hearing "is not really responsive in
cases . . . where a class alleges systemic malfeasance. Such problems are treated inefficiently if
they must be pursued individually." Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d at 512.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988).
110. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970) (rejecting the "argument that a federal
court is without power to review state welfare provisions or prohibit the use of federal funds by the
States in view of the fact that Congress has lodged in the Department of HEW the power to cut off
federal funds for noncompliance with statutory requirements"). See also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508
(holding that under Section 1983, federal courts can enforce the right to reasonable rent and utility
rates created by the Boren Amendment); Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24 (holding that the authority of
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claims."" In fact, the Supreme Court has found statutory remedies suf-
ficient to foreclose Section 1983 claims in only two cases, Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association
112
and Smith v. Robinson."" In both cases, the remedial schemes were
much more comprehensive than the scheme created by the Act.114 Un-
like the statutes in question in Middlesex and Smith, the Act does not
contain provisions for private judicial enforcement of its requirements,
which is precisely why Section 1983 claims are needed.
Because Section 1983 claims have not be foreclosed by Congress, a
court must determine whether the Act itself creates enforceable rights
under Section 1983. The first prong examines whether the statute at
issue is intended to benefit the plaintiff. The purpose and goals of the
Act reveal Congress's intention to benefit foster children. Congress en-
acted the Act "for the purpose of enabling each State to provide, in
appropriate cases, foster care and adoption assistance for children."11 5
The Act requires states to provide the following for children and their
families: preventive services to help reduce the need for foster care,
proper care to children in foster care, and permanency planning ser-
vices. 1 6 Thus, the intended beneficiaries of these programs are children
in foster care, 1 children at risk of entering the foster care system,118
and the biological and foster parents and other caretakers of these
children." 9
HUD to enforce benefits for housing project tenants did not exclude private enforcement in the
courts under Section 1983).
111. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 523 (rejecting the argument that the "existence of administra-
tive procedures . . .evidences an intent to foreclose a private remedy in the federal courts");
Wright, 479 U.S. at 426-27; Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
In Social Security Act cases, the Court traditionally has allowed Section 1983 claims. See, for
example, Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 9; Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 131 (1979); Quern v. Mandley,
436 U.S. 725, 529-30 n.3 (1978); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 284 n.2 (1971); Rosado, 397
U.S. at 401; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968). The Court also has required an express
statement of intent to foreclose claims. See, for example, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762
(1975).
112. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
113. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
114. In National Sea Clammers, the statutes at issue provided that any interested person
could seek judicial review of actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator.
453 U.S. at 13-14. The statutes expressly authorized "private persons to sue for injunctions to
enforce these statutes." Id. at 14. In Smith v. Robinson, the Court held that Congress intended the
private judicial enforcement provisions of the statute to be the "exclusive avenue" through which a
plaintiff may assert Equal Protection claims under the act. 468 U.S. at 1009-12.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1988).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79 (1988).
117. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Sero., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992). As
Justice Blackmun noted, the children are the intended beneficiaries of the reasonable efforts re-
quirement. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1370, 1372-73 (Blackmun dissenting).
118. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 616 (cited in note 35).
119. Id.
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The second prong of the test requires determining whether the Act
merely reflects a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct
or whether it creates a binding obligation on the governmental unit.120
Arguably, the Act is only a statement of congressional preference be-
cause the states are free to forego the financial assistance that the Act
provides. This argument must be rejected, however, in light of the
Court's allowance of a Section 1983 claim in Wilder under the Boren
Amendment. The statute in Wilder provided federal financial assis-
tance to states that voluntarily complied with its Medicaid require-
ments.12" ' The Wilder Court reasoned that because compliance with the
federal statute was a condition precedent to the receipt of federal assis-
tance, the statute set forth a congressional command.122 Therefore, be-
cause the Boren Amendment set forth a duty with which participating
states must comply in order to receive funds, the plaintiffs had a right
to enforce that duty through use of Section 1983.123
In addition, the second prong of the test is not met unless Congress
clearly expressed an intention to bind the states. In Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman,2 4 the Supreme Court held that
Congress's intention to condition federal funding on compliance by the
states must be expressed clearly so that the states could decide know-
ingly whether to comply. 12 5 The clear language of the Act's reasonable
efforts requirement meets the Pennhurst test and thus makes the Act's
provisions mandatory upon participating state plans. Section 671(a) ex-
plicitly provides that a state must meet the statute's requirements to be
eligible for funding.'26 The Act indicates a clear intent to bind the state
120. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
121. Id.
122. The Court found the congressional mandate "wholly uncharacteristic of a mere sugges-
tion of nudge." Id. at 512 (quoting West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 20 (3d Cir.
1989), afl'd, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991)). In upholding the Section 1983 claim, the Wilder Court distin-
guished an earlier case, Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), which
involved a federal funding statute without language suggesting that the statute was a condition for
the receipt of federal assistance. Id. at 510. As such, the Pennhurst Court held that the statute
simply set forth congressional preferences. Id.
123. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 617 (cited in note 35) (stating that under Hohfeldian termi-
nology terms "right" and "duty" are jural correlatives) (citing Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L. J. 710, 717 (1917)).
124. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
125. In Pennhurst, the Court found that Section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled As-
sistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1988), did not create a binding obligation
because neither the statute nor the corresponding regulations conditioned receipt of federal fund-
ing on compliance with the provision. 451 U.S. at 24.
126. Section 671(b) provides as follows:
The Secretary shall approve any plan which complies with the provisions of subsection (a) of
this section. However, in any case in which the Secretary finds, after reasonable notice and
opportunity for a hearing, that a State plan which has been approved by the Secretary no
longer complies with the provisions of subsection (a), of this section, or that in the adminis-
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because it presents the state with a quid pro quo: exchanging foster




In addition, the reasonable efforts clause imposes a binding obligation
on the state because it is "cast in mandatory rather than precatory
terms." 28
The final inquiry is to determine whether the asserted interests of
foster children are so vague and amorphous that the judiciary lacks the
competence to enforce them. 29 The reasonable efforts requirement of
the Act is specific enough to create Section 1983 rights for several rea-
sons. First, the Act's language itself is sufficiently specific to render the
reasonable efforts requirement enforceable for purposes of Section 1983.
Because the Act clearly states the purpose of the requirement-to pre-
vent separating a child from his family and home and to return the
children who have been removed to their homes-the reasonable efforts
requirement is not too vague and amorphous for courts and trained
professionals to decipher. 8°
Furthermore, the Constitution itself uses "reasonableness" as a
standard of behavior,' and the courts regularly determine, on a case
by case basis, whether the standard of reasonableness has been met."2
In addition, the standard of a "reasonable" person is vital to the com-
tration of the plan there is a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the plan, the
Secretary shall notify the State that further payments will not be made to the State under
this part [42 USCS §§ 670 et seq.], or that such payments will be made to the State but
reduced by an amount which the Secretary deems appropriate, until the Secretary is satisfied
that there is no longer any such failure to comply, and until he is so satisfied he shall make no
further payments to the State, or shall reduce such payments by the amount specified in his
notification to the State.
42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (1988). See also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510 (finding congressional conditions
mandatory where "provision of federal funds is expressly conditioned on compliance").
127. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 1992). By
holding that the Act does create enforceable rights, the Tenth Circuit rejected its former position
that it had articulated in Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1386 (10th Cir. 1989). In
Spielman, the Tenth Circuit suggested that though the Act sets minimum requirements as prereq-
uisites for federal funding that may not be enough to meet the "mandate requirement" of Pen-
nhurst. See also Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Serv., 820 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating, without further analysis, that the Act was "enacted to enable states to provide financial
assistance to needy persons and not as a means of seeking compensation when one of those persons
is indirectly injured by the state"). These cases support the argument that the Act, like the statute
in Pennhurst, only encourages rather than mandates a specific entitlement.
128. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
129. See id.
130. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 623-24 (cited in note 35).
131. For example, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
132. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 620-21 (cited in note 35). See, for example, Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (saying that the protections of Fourth Amendment apply when person
has reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched by the authorities); Warden, Maryland
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mon law tradition, especially in tort and contract contexts.' In those
contexts, the concept of "reasonable" is almost completely undefined
and is determined by the factfinder on a case by case basis.'3 There-
fore, the use of a "reasonable efforts" standard to enforce the Act
should not present an unsuual obstacle for the courts.
The Supreme Court also has found the standard of reasonableness
enforceable in other federal funding cases, such as Wilder.3 5 The stat-
ute in Wilder required that reimbursement rates for Medicaid be rea-
sonable and adequate to meet the costs incurred by efficiently run
facilities.136 Though the act did not define "reasonable and adequate,"
the Court found that the standard was specific enough to enforce, in
part, because the statute and the accompanying regulations set forth
factors that states must consider in adopting their rates. 37 Using simi-
lar reasoning, the Supreme Court held in Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority3 5 that the term "reasonable" as a
standard of conduct was not too vague and amorphous to create an en-
forceable Section 1983 right.
3 9
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (saying that a warrantless search is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment if exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit exist).
133. For example, basic tort law measures negligence in terms of the behavior of a reasonable
person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 30 (West, 5th ed. 1984). What constitutes reasonableness must be deter-
mined by a jury on the facts of each case.
In contract law, a promisor may have to use reasonable efforts to perform his or her contrac-
tual duties if such efforts are an express provision of the contract or if the other party must rely on
those efforts to receive the benefit of the bargain. Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(N.Y. 1917). In addition, the law regarding offer and acceptance focuses on the concept of a rea-
sonable time. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 3.19 (Little, Brown, 2d ed.
1990); Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2.
134. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 624 (cited in note 35). With respect to the test's final
element, Justice Blackmun, in his Suter dissent, observed that federal courts "in innumerable
cases, have routinely enforced reasonableness clauses in federal statutes." Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1374.
See also Virginia R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (enforcing reasonable efforts
provisions of the Railway Labor Act and noting that the reasonableness issue is an everyday sub-
ject of inquiry by courts in developing and enforcing the laws).
135. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
136. Id. at 501-02.
137. Id. at 502. Among these factors were
(1) the unique situation (financial and otherwise) of a hospital that serves a disproportionate
number of low income patients, (2) the statutory requirements for adequate care in a nursing
home, and (3) the special situation of hospitals providing inpatient care when long-term care
at a nursing home would be sufficient but unavailable.
Id. at 502-03.
138. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
139. In Wright, the Court upheld a Section 1983 claim based on the Brooke Amendment to
the Housing Act of 1937, which limited the amount of rent that a public housing tenant could be
charged and required the inclusion of a reasonable rent allowance for utilities. The Court rejected
the argument that the reasonable utilities provision was too vague and amorphous, concluding that
702
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In both Wilder and Wright, the Court relied on the regulations
promulgated by the overseeing federal agencies or on some other objec-
tive benchmark to measure compliance with federal law that limited the
state's discretion.140 This reliance suggests that, in order to find suffi-
cient specificity for a Section 1983 right, the Court wants to ensure that
the state agency's discretion is limited when the statutory language
grants broad authority.'
The regulations promulgated under the Act provide the objective
benchmark the Court demands. The regulations 42 set forth specific
types of child welfare services,' the provision of which may satisfy the
reasonable efforts requirement. These specific examples of reasonable
services give guidance comparable to the regulations explaining the
statutes that were considered in Wilder and Wright. 44 Although state
agencies retain the flexibility to assess individual family situations and
devise a service-based solution,145 the regulations provide specific exam-
ples that give states guidance so that they will understand the reasona-
the regulations included sufficient guidelines to create an enforceable right. Wright, 479 U.S. at
112.
140. In Wilder the states were to measure the reasonableness of the rates against the "objec-
tive benchmark" of an efficiently and economically operated facility. Id. at 519. Thus, the states,
while they had considerable flexibility in establishing and calculating rates, were not allowed un-
limited discretion. Id. at 519-20. Furthermore, although evaluating the reasonableness of a state's
rates might require some knowledge of the hospital industry, the Wilder Court found this inquiry
well within the competence of the judiciary. Id. at 520. The regulations required that housing
authorities calculate their utility allowances
on the basis of current data, to set the allowances in such a fashion that 90 percent of a
particular authority's dwelling units do not pay surcharges, and to review tenant surcharges
quarterly and consider revision of the allowances if more than 25 percent of any category of
units are being surcharged.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 421-22 n.4.
141. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 623 (cited in note 35).
142. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b). Several lower courts had determined prior to Suter that the
"reasonable" language in the Act did create an enforceable Section 1983 right. See Yvonne L. v.
New Mexico Dep't of Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992); Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d
1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a reasonable person would have known that inaction was
unlawful); Massinga, 838 F.2d at 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that an official should have known
that failure to comply with the statute would violate constitutional rights of children); LaShawn A.
v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 970, 986 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that the District of Columbia Child
and Family Services Agency failed to use reasonable efforts to protect children); Norman v. John-
son, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-87 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that the reasonable efforts requirement is
a flexible standard that leaves much discretion to states). But see Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F.
Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the rights created by Child Welfare Act were too
amorphous to be enforceable); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
143. 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e).
144. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 623.
145. In Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court reasoned that
a reasonable effort standard is flexible and leaves the states much discretion in providing child
welfare services. Id.
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ble efforts requirement.14 6 Consequently, the judiciary has an objective
benchmark by which to evaluate the state's actions. Therefore, the Act
satisfies the three-pronged test, and foster children should be permitted
to use Section 1983 claims to enforce the reasonable efforts requirement
of the Act.
147
B. Substantive Due Process Claims: A Foster Child's Right to
Safety
Claims asserted under the Child Welfare Act often are accompa-
nied by constitutional substantive Due Process claims." 8 Section 1983
provides a civil cause of action in federal court against any person" 9
146. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the Child Welfare League
of America, the Youth Law Center, and the National Center for Youth Law also have produced
reasonable efforts guidelines. Atwell, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 623 n.201 (cited in note 35).
147. As plaintiffs, foster children also might argue that the Act gives them an implied right
to seek enforcement of its provisions. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (197§), the Supreme Court articu-
lated four relevant factors in determining whether to infer a cause of action from a federal statute:
first, whether plaintiff is a member of the class that the statute was enacted to benefit; second,
whether the legislature intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create or to deny such a remedy; third,
whether an implied remedy for the plaintiff is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legis-
lative scheme; and finally, whether the cause of action is traditionally a state law concern so that
inferring a cause of action based solely on federal law would bi inappropriate. Id. at 78. According
to the Supreme Court, the central inquiry is whether Congress intended, either expressly or by
implication, to create a private cause of action. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575
(1979).
Thus, the implied right analysis is similar to the Section 1983 question. B.H. v. Johnson, 715
F. Supp. 1387, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See also Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33 (O'Connor dissenting)
(applying the Cort analysis in determining whether the enforceable rights existed within the mean-
ing of Section 1983); Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that the in-
quiry under Section 1983 resembles the analysis used to determine whether a private cause of
action may be implied from an enactment of Congress). The majority in Suter quickly disposed of
the implied right argument with little explanation. However, the dissent's assertion that an im-
plied right does exist merits attention as it follows Cort more closely.
148. See, for example, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 202
(1989) (stating that "the State had no constitutional duty to protect [a child] against his father's
violence.... [Even] its failure to do so ... simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause"); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
when "the State removed a child from the custody of her parents ... it could no more place her in
a position of danger, deliberately and without justification, without thereby violating her rights
under the due process clause of the Fourteeenth Amendment, than it could deliberately and with-
out justification place a criminal defendant in jail or prison in which his health or safety would be
endangered, without violating his rights either under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment... or the due process clause"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-98
(11th Cir. 1987) (asserting: "We hold that a child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a
situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal institution and a child confined in a mental health
facility that the foster child may bring a Section 1983 action for violation of Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights"); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 649 F.2d 134, 141-47 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that a child in foster care had a constitutional right to be safeguarded from abuse).
149. Municipalities and other local government units are included among those persons to
whom Section 1983 applies. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). ,
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acting or failing to act under color of state law, who deprives another of
constitutionally guaranteed rights.150 These rights are protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that
a state shall not deprive residents of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.' 5 ' The substantive component of Due Process pro-
tects liberty interests that are so fundamental that the state cannot
take them away.152 Among these guaranteed liberties is the right to be
free from unjustified intrusions on personal security, which includes the
right to freedom from bodily restraint and punishment. 153
While the language of the Due Process Clause merely prohibits cer-
tain state action, the courts have interpreted it to impose positive du-
ties on the state in certain limited circumstances. A line of Supreme
Court cases has acknowledged that substantive due process rights may
emanate from the state's positive exercise of its power. 54 Courts have
extended this doctrine's application from prisoners and mental patients
150. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (noting that the first inquiry in any Section
1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and its
laws). See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1975) (holding that Section 1983 imposes
liability only for conduct that subjects or causes the complaining party to be subjected to a depri-
vation of such a secured right).
151. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
152. Another avenue that can be used to vindicate a child's right to safe foster care condi-
tions involves a procedural Due Process claim, based on a wrongful deprivation of rights and bene-
fits (entitlements) applicable to foster care custody created under state law and regulation. See Bd.
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
Two federal circuits have found a procedural Due Process right to access to federal protection
based on state foster caie legislation. In Taylor u. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), the
Eleventh Circuit found sufficient protective responsibilities, based on a number of duties articu-
lated in the Georgia child care statutory scheme, to impose procedural Due Process obligations on
the state. Similarly, in Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990), the
Sixth Circuit held that Kentucky had a legislative obligation to provide foster children with "a
program of care, treatment and rehabilitation" and had responsibility "for the operation, manage-
ment and development of the existing state facilities for the custodial care and rehabilitation of
children." Id. at 476-77. In both of these cases, the courts were speaking of potential liability in
summary dispositions and had not ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the al-
leged harm occurred and that damages were due. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 374-75 (cited in
note 10).
153. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1976). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982) (finding that a mentally retarded boy involuntarily committed to a state institution has
liberty interests in reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from unreasonable bod-
ily restraints).
154. See, for example, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires the state to provide ade-
quate medical care to incarcerated prisoners); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314-25 (holding that the
substantive component of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requires the state to provide invol-
untarily committed mental patients with the services necessary to ensure their reasonable safety).
See also Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the estate of a mental institu-
tion child inmate who was beaten to death by fellow inmates had a valid due process claim against
state hospital officials who were aware that the child had been beaten in the past but failed to take
steps to protect him).
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in the state's care to any persons in state custody.'55 Taken together,
these cases propose that when states hold persons in custody against
their will, the Constitution imposes a duty to assume responsibility for
their safety and well-being. 156 In other words, because the state affirma-
tively exercises its power to restrain a person's liberty, rendering him
unable to care for himself, the state must provide for his basic human
needs. 7 These basic needs consist of food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety.15 8
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services,'59 the
Court left unresolved the question of whether the state may be liable
under the Due Process Clause for failing to protect children in foster
homes from mistreatment by their foster parents. 60 Lower courts have
held state placement agencies liable for injuries to children received
while in foster care, reasoning that foster care constitutes exactly the
kind of custody that triggers the protection of the Due Process
155. See Society, for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (2d
Cir. 1984) (extending Youngberg to any person in state custody and holding that the state was
required to exercise accepted "professional judgment" in safeguarding the security of children in
its custody). See also Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding that a
mentally retarded juvenile placed in DCFS-run shelter who was attacked and beaten by residents
had a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action against DCFS employees and officials).
156. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (1989). See also Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317 (stating that
"when a person is institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the state ... a duty to provide
certain services and care does exist").
157. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. State-run foster care placement constitutes the kind of cus-
tody for which the state must provide for the safety and physical needs of the affected children.
Thus, "more than negligent" withholding or denial of services can be a constitutionally actionable
deprivation. The distinction between supervision by governmental welfare offices as opposed to
private contractors retained to manage foster care programs is irrelevant. Further, whether the
care is provided in group homes by the state or in the homes of private citizens who are licensed
and supervised to be foster parents is of no consequence to the creation of the action. Skoler, 16
Pepperdine L. Rev, at 376 (cited in note 10).
158. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
159. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). For discussions of DeShaney's impact on the state's duty to protect
children, see generally Kristen L. Davenport, Note, Due Process-Claims of Abused Children
Against State Protective Agencies-The State's Responsibility After DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 243 (1991); Mark Levine, The Need
for the "Special Relationship" Doctrine in the Child Protection Context: DeShaney v. Winne-
bago, 56 Brooklyn L. Rev. 329 (1990); Dennis A. Bjorklund, Crossing DeShaney: Can the Gap Be
Closed Between Child Abuse in the Home and the State's Duty to Protect?, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 791
(1990); Garrett M. Smith, Note, DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of Consti-
tutional Torts, 49 Md. L. Rev. 484 (1990); Breaden Marshall Douthett, The Death of Constitu-
tional Duty: The Court Reacts to the Expansion of Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 52 Ohio St. L. J. 643 (1991); Thomas A. Eaton
and Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction As A Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and its After-
math, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 107 (1991).
160. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n. 9.
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Clause.161 When the state implements its foster care operations, it "acts
affirmatively to supplant the.., role of natural parents and to exercise
... custodial power over foster children in order to keep them safe from
abuse and neglect."162 Foster children are entirely dependent on the
state for protection through proper placements and proper supervision.
A foster child "is in a situation.., analogous to a prisoner in a penal
institution and a child confined in a mental health facility."1 '' By as-
suming custody of a child, state authorities cut off the child's avenues
of self-help.164 Therefore, the Due Process Clause guarantees that foster
children's basic needs are met, which include a child's physical and
emotional well-being, and it protects them against arbitrary intrusions
on their personal security.1 5
161. See, for example, Doe v. Lambert, No. 87 C 8150 (N.D. IlM. April 19, 1988) (finding that
a child has a substantive Due Process claim against state and county officials who are responsible
for his foster home placement that resulted in injuries while in the physical custody of the foster
parents); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d at 799.
162. Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process Right
To Safety, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 113, 157 (1990).
163. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. at 1396 (quoting Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797).
164. The Johnson court stated:
We believe the risk of harm is great enough to bring foster children under the umbrella of
protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment. Children in foster homes ... are isolated;
no persons outside the home setting are present to witness and report mistreatment. The
children are helpless. Without the investigation, supervision, and constant contact required
by statute, a child placed in a foster home is at the mercy of the foster parents.
Id. at 1396. The Second Circuit has reached a similar holding. See Doe v. New York City Dep't of
Soc. Serv., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Doe v. Lambert, No. 87 C 8150 (finding
that a child has a Section 1983 substantive Due Process claim against DCFS for injuries he suf-
fered while in foster care); Doe v. Bobbitt, 665 F. Supp. 691, 697 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding that a
complaint stated a valid Fourteenth Amendment cause of action against a state agency where the
state agent removed the child from her home and placed her in a foster home that the agent
suspected was unsafe and in which the child was injured).
165. See B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. at 1394-97 (holding that a child who is directly or
indirectly in state custody has a substantive Due Process right to be free from unreasonable and
unnecessary intrusions on both his physical and emotional well-being and a right to adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that substantive Due Process rights of children are implicated where police officers arbitrarily re-
fuse to aid children endangered by the officers' performances of their official duties).
The Johnson court, however, did not recognize the claims of foster children in regard to guide-
lines in the Act, such as parental and sibling visitation, placements in the least restrictive settings
possible, and adequately trained caseworkers. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. at 1397-98.
There is no constitutional obligation on the state either to provide plaintiffs with welfare or
housing benefits or to affirmatively insurance a given type of family life, and none may be
created by inference and misdirection through the penumbral constitutional family right to
familial privacy. Though this Court has the power to insure that no state agency improperly
interfere in ... family life, it does not have the power to enforce the laudable sociological
view of the importance of the family held by plaintiffs and their next friends.
Id. at 1397 (quoting Black v. Beame, 419 F. Supp. 599, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 815 (2d
Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). Because "the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate an opti-
mal level of care and treatment," these claims lie beyond the reach of substantive Due Process. Id.
at 1397-98.
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1. Voluntary Versus Involuntary Placement: A Distinction Without a
Difference
Prior to DeShaney, courts generally did not distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary placements in the face of substantive Due
Process claims. The courts reasoned that once a child had come into the
hands of the state or its agents, that dependence alone, particularly for
minors and incompetents in institutional settings, was sufficient to gen-
erate affirmative care responsibilities.166 After DeShaney, some courts
found the distinction relevant to the determination of Due Process
rights.
In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social Ser-
vices, 67 the Fourth Circuit held that because the abused child plaintiff
was voluntarily placed in the foster home by his natural parents, he was
not in state custody nor in a predicament created by state action. 68
Under this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit held that the child voluntarily
placed in a foster home by his natural parents and then severely physi-
cally abused while in foster care has no Due Process right against the
social services agency when its workers did not remove the child after
reports of probable abuse. 6 ' The Fourth Circuit found, comparing the
case to DeShaney, that the state had not restrained the foster child's
liberty and that the child's resulting injury during foster care custody
was caused by individuals who were not state actors. 1 0 The Fourth Cir-
cuit reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the state
agency located and contracted with the foster parents for the required
166. See, for example, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
at 1245 (stating that it need not decide whether residents of a developmental center are voluntarily
or involuntarily there because in either case they are entitled to safe conditions and freedom from
undue restraint).
Several district courts reached similar conclusions about equal status for voluntary and invol-
untary admittees to state facilities. See, for example, Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804
(8th Cir. 1978); McCartney v. Barg, 643 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Kolpak v. Bell, 619
F. Supp. 359, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1985). In some cases, the courts stated that voluntary placement of
children in state hands never could compromise the constitutional rights of children to be pro-
tected from violent conditions or substandard care. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 361 (cited in
note 10) (citing Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1987); Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Naughton v. Bevliaqua, 458 F. Supp.
610 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979)).
167. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989).
168. Id. at 479.
169. Id. at 476.
170. Id. at 476-79. Similarly, in Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), a
federal district court held that a child whose parents voluntarily committed him to a state institu-
tion for the severely retarded could not claim a Due Process right to a safe environment. See also
Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 362. The district court noted that the boy's parents were aware of
the conditions at the facility and that the state did not affirmatively require the child to remain
there. Id. See also 738 F. Supp. 258, 259 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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care and inspected and approved the foster home for the voluntary
placement.""
Using a voluntariness distinction to determine whether due process
rights are implicated is unsound.17 2 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court
staked its "liberty interest desideratum on custody (or other affirmative
state action) which impairs the child's ability to protect or care for it-
self or obtain such help from parents or others."1 73 A child voluntarily
placed in foster care is equally dependent on state care and protection
as a child committed by a court order. In reality, "voluntary commit-
ment can be the functional equivalent of a 'plea bargain' negotiated to
avoid the expense"' 7 and emotional distress involved in a state court
neglect or abuse proceeding. Therefore, voluntarily committed children
should have the same protection as that enjoyed by children placed in
state foster care by the courts.
Allowing such a voluntariness distinction to excuse official liability
for extreme indifference to known safety and care hazards surely will be
detrimental to children. 175 Both voluntarily and involuntarily placed
children face the same predicament. More often than not, the same
state court or state agency will supervise both voluntary and court-or-
dered placements. The same requirements for proper care and place-
ment apply, and as such, all foster children should be treated alike in
regard to asserting their due process rights.
2. Standards to Determine State Liability
The courts have articulated two broad standards to determine the
liability of state agencies for abuse of foster children: the deliberate in-
171. 871 F.2d at 477.
172. Significantly, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the basis of the Court's current
doctrine regarding when involuntary civil custody arrangements generate substantive Due Process
obligations, involved a retarded boy whose mother asked the local court to admit him to a state-
run institution permanently. Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1985). The mother's
choice in Youngberg illustrates the blurriness of the voluntary-involuntary placement distinction.
Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 363 (cited in note 10). Moreover, the interests of children and the
parents who may be abusing and neglecting them do not coincide, thus the courts should not
accept parents as "proxies" for making custody decisions on behalf of their children. Id. See Amer-
ican Bar Association and Institute of Judicial Admin. Juvenile Justice Standard, Counsel for Pri-
vate Parties § 2.3(b) (1980) (advocating representation for children, independent of counsel for
their parents, in neglect, dependency, custody, and adoption proceedings).
The Supreme Court stated that many" 'voluntary' placements are in fact coerced by threat of
neglect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the sense.of the product of an informed con-
sent." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (cited in note 3).
173. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 379 (cited in note 10).
174. Id.
175. Courts always have considered children legally disabled parties who need special state
protection and care. See, for example, New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rocke-
feller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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difference and professional judgment standards.17 ' Following Supreme
Court precedents in other areas, 1" the courts seem to concur that negli-
gence or even gross negligence on the part of state and local child wel-
fare agencies is not enough to trigger liability.178 The courts have
required some knowledge of potential danger or risk to the child's
safety. 7 9 The courts have not articulated the level of knowledge re-
quired under a given set of circumstances or whether the knowledge
requirement is case-specific.180 Part of the Supreme Court's unfinished
business regarding foster care custody rights is to provide some specific-
ity to the standards it has constructed.181
Some courts have found that when caseworkers were deliberately
indifferent or when the agency failed to respond to threats to or viola-
tions of a child's clearly established rights, liability exists.8 2 The delib-
erate indifference test previously was applied to the supervision of
wardens, police chiefs, and hospital administrators.188 In Doe v. New
York,' the Second Circuit recognized that care in such institutional
settings was easier to monitor than foster home care because
caseworkers, in the child welfare context, can make only occasional su-
pervisory visits. 18 5 In addition, less exercise of hierarchical authority
among state workers is desirable in the foster care context than in insti-
tutional custody situations.88 The Second Circuit stated that good fos-
ter care tries to approximate a normal family environment, with few
intrusions, and it facilitates a respect for foster family autonomy and
integrity, which are necessary for successful relationships. 187 Because of
176. See, for example, Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom., Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (employing the deliberate
indifference standard); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990) (employing the departure
from professional standards test).
177. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (stating that mere negligence of a state
official does not constitute deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause);
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (rejecting gross negligence standard for holding
liable a municipal official for failure to train employee).
178. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 371 (cited in note 10).
179. See, for example, Morgan, 914 F.2d at 852 (stating that neither negligence nor gross
negligence alone can satisfy the elements of knowledge and deliberate action required to constitute
a violation); Doe v. New York, 649 F.2d at 143 (stating that gross negligence can only create a
presumption of deliberate indifference).
180. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 371.
181. Id. at 370.
182. See Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794; Doe v. New York, 649 F.2d at 141; Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
183. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 370.
184. 649 F.2d 134.





the differences between foster care and institutional custody, the courts
have felt that deliberate indifference should not be inferred from a
child welfare caseworker's failure to act as readily as might be done in a
prison situation.188 For example, caseworkers often may take an unob-
trusive stance, choosing to give the foster family the benefit of the
doubt, rather than deciding to interfere.189
Other circuits have found that the Supreme Court's professional
judgment standard9 " is more appropriate in the foster care context.191
Here, once the child's safety interest has been violated, official liability
depends on whether the state workers adhered to accepted professional
standards and practices in deciding to place or maintain children in sit-
uations of known risk.192 The controlling standard for determining
whether those rights have been violated is whether professional judg-
ment, in fact, was exercised.193 The constitutional norm is violated only
when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards that the
person responsible could not have based the decision on such a
judgment.
194
The scope of the professional judgment test has been circumscribed
as well. In K.H. v. Morgan,"" the Seventh Circuit took a restrictive
view of agency and worker responsibility. The concurrence built into
the professional judgment test a defense for lack of resources so that no
liability would attach, even for placements involving known risks of
abuse, if the responsible agency did not have resources to assure a
proper placement. 9 6 The Seventh Circuit emphasized the law's antipa-
188. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 370 (cited in note 10).
189. Id.
190. The Supreme Court formulated this standard in child institutionalization cases. See, for
example, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (cited
in note 3).
191. See, for example, K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
192. Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 370. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. A professional's
decision is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision is a substantial
departure from the judgment that such a professional is presumed to exercise. Id.
193. Id. at 321.
194. Id. at 323.
195. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990). K.H. v. Morgan involved a young girl who was placed in
nine foster homes in four years, some of which involved beatings and sexual assault. Id. at 848. In
its detailed analysis of the professional judgment test applied in the foster care context, the court
held that a narrow approach to agency and worker liability was appropriate even though the
caseworkers were aware of the risks to the child. Id. at 852.
196. Id. at 867-68 (Coffey concurring in part and dissenting in part). This position was de-
rived from the Youngberg opinion, in which the Court stated that a "professional will not be liable
[for damages] if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary
constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity would bar liability." Id. at 867 n.18 (quoting
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 (1982)).
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thy to damage suits in the foster care context, the nation's lack of ade-
quate foster care facilities, and the minimal obligations of the state in
caring for children in state custody.1 9 The Morgan opinion raised a
number of questions"9 8 that, when answered, will refine the contours of
the law in this area and clarify the state's specific duties under the Due
Process Clause.
Both the deliberate indifference and professional judgment stan-
dards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the difficulties faced by
agencies and caseworkers that provide care and supervision constrained
by minimal resources. Enforcement of the Act will make the duties of
the state and its employees clearer to produce more exacting analysis of
state responsibilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to establish the provisions of the Act as standard proce-
dure rather than amorphous guidelines for state foster care agencies,
the Supreme Court should endorse the general acceptance of Section
1983 private enforcement actions of foster care obligations. Recent cir-
cuit decisions have scrutinized carefully the issues, and have adhered
faithfully to established Supreme Court standards concerning when
such enforcement is suitable. If Section 1983 actions are not recognized,
the goals set out by the Act to benefit foster children by finding perma-
nent homes remain illusory ideals that exist only on paper. The plight
of foster children and the ailing system designed to serve them will not
improve if these essential reforms are not implemented.
Until the reforms outlined in the Act in fact are implemented so
that the need for foster care diminishes, the safety of children already
in the system must remain a primary focus. Apart from the remedy that
Congress provided through the Act, courts have established a constitu-
tional right to safe foster care for children in state custody, grounded in
Fourteenth Amendment substantive Due Process liberty interests.'99 As
197. See Morgan at 853.
198. These questions include whether mild danger signals of abuse followed by no investiga-
tion whatsoever would produce the requisite failure to exercise professional judgment, and
whether, in the case of unmistakable reports or a history of abuse by particular foster parents, the
Seventh Circuit's test really would protect agency personnel who make or tolerate a risky place-
ment on grounds that there were no other foster homes or institutional placements available. Sko-
ler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 370-71 (cited in note 10).
199. Many issues remain unresolved. The courts must fashion fact-related boundaries to de-
termine what kinds of conduct are violative of the right to safety, what standards for measuring
such violations should be, what obligations should be imposed on the professionals who supervise
foster families, and what obligations government agencies must discharge. Other issues include
what sorts of foster care services are mandated by the right to safety and whether state actors can
claim immunity from liability. The courts also must clarify whether and when "state foreclosure of
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a result, foster children are entitled to protection from injury intention-
ally inflicted by their foster parents and to the provision of basic neces-
sities such as food, shelter, and medical care. These rights are "rooted
in affirmative governmental obligations" that arise when the state as-
sumes custody of a child because that undertaking substantially fore-
closes that child's other avenues for care and protection. 00
When used together, Section 1983 and substantive due process ac-
tions will help accomplish the preventive, care, and permanency goals
of the Act, while reinforcing the right to safe foster care for children.
Thus, systemic reform in the provision of child welfare services may be
achieved without sacrificing the safety of the children currently in the
system. If the judiciary does not make these claims available to foster
children, the overburdened, ineffective foster care system will be slow to
change.
The Federal District Court of the District of Columbia aptly sum-
marized the foster care crisis in LaShawn A. v. Dixon:201
[This] is a case about thousands of children who, due to family financial problems,
psychological problems, and substance abuse problems, among other things, rely on
the [state] to provide them with food, shelter, and day-to-day care.... It is about
the failures of an ineptly managed child welfare system ... and the resultant trage-
dies for... children relegated to entire childhoods spent in foster care drift. Unfor-
tunately, it is about a lost generation of children whose tragic plight is being
repeated every day.
2 0 2
Society has humanitarian and utilitarian interests in reforming the fos-
ter care system before more young lives are damaged. Children are our
society's most helpless segment, and yet they are its most valuable re-
source. Their rights to safety and proper care must be guaranteed to
ensure our future.
Cristina Chi-Young Chou
opportunity and freedom in the foster care context can implicate the child's protected liberty in-
terest in safe foster care." Skoler, 18 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 376.
200. Id. at 375-76. The rights to safety and basic care are not dependent on constitutional
cruel and unusual punishment guarantees or the special relationship doctrine that some courts
have held to establish affirmative duties to individuals who are not strictly in state custody. Laura
Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Con-
text, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 659, 677-83 (1990). See also Sheryl A. Donella, Safe Foster Care: A Constitu-
tional Mandate, 19 Family L. Q. 79 (1985).
201. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
202. Id. at 960.
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